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requires him to build an expensive fence or sell out. At this point, it is
urged that in this age of planned obsolescence by automotive manu-
facturers, junk yards perform a service indispensible to the public.
Why burden either the small junkman or the large operator with
such unreasonable restrictions? We are told it is for aesthetic ob-
jectives alone.
May a business or a class of businesses be arbitrarily declared to
be a public nuisance, as a matter of law, when in fact not a nuisance?
Michigan9 and Ohio10 courts say no.
The punitive hand of this statute falls too heavily. The statute
provides: "and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred dollars and not more than one thousand
dollars. Each day of violation of the provisions of KRS 177.905 to KRS
177.950 shall constitute a separate offense." 1 (Emphasis added.) It is
submitted that this expressly violates section 17 of the Constitution of
Kentucky and amendment eight of the Constitution of the United
States, which provide that excessive fines shall not be imposed. It was
urged by counsel for the state that these provisions were necessary to
put teeth into the statute.'2 "Teeth" is grossly inadequate to describe a
1,000 dollar a day penalty for offending such a nebulous concept
as "beauty." It is submitted that the criminal penalties are much too
excessive and are violative of the Kentucky and the United States
Constitutions.
Reasonable regulation in many areas is not only desirable, but
necessary. We must not confine ourselves to regulating one class of
business while allowing others, more ugly and more dangerous than
junk yards, to operate openly and without regulation. We cannot
allow regulation to become confiscatory, nor should the regulation
bear more heavily than conditions require, for this is when regulation
becomes unreasonable and unconstitutional.
Harry M. Snyder Jr.
TORT-MuNICIPAL TORT IMMUNITY DocrRaNE.-A seven-year-old child
drowned in a municipal swimming pool. The administratrix of her
estate filed suit against the City of Lexington, Kentucky, alleging that
the child's death was caused by the negligent operation of the pool by
9 Bzovi v. City of Livonia, 850 Mich. 489, 87 N.W.2d 110 (1957).
10 City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1949).
1LKy. Rev. Stat. § 177.990(3) (1962).




the defendant city. The city defended on the ground that, because the
operation and maintenance of parks and recreational facilities are
classified as governmental functions, a municipal corporation is not
liable for injury or death resulting from the negligent operation of such
facilities. Held: Municipal corporations should not be immune from
tort liability. The court pointed out, however, that the decision was not
intended to impose liability on the municipality when an injury re-
sults from the exercise of 'legislative," "judicial," "quasi-legislative,"
or "quasi-judicial" functions. The court applied the decision retro-
actively to all tort actions against municipalities not barred by the
statute of limitations. Haney v. City of Lexington, 886 S.W.2d 738
(Ky. 1964).
The origin of governmental tort immunity seems to have been the
common law maxim that "the King can do no wrong"; that by virtue
of the king's sovereignty, he could be subjected to no one; and that
his person was sacred.' Ostensibly, the first case to extend the gov-
ernmental immunity doctrine to a municipality was Russell v. Men
of Devon, decided in 1798.2
Since that date, in apparent attempts to soften the application
of the rule in individual cases, the courts have engrafted into the
law numerous distinctions to be applied in determining liability.
The most popular of these is the distinction between the "govern-
mental" and "proprietary" functions of municipalities. If the city is
engaged in a "governmental," "political," or "public" function at the
time the injury is inflicted, then no recovery will be allowed. On the
other hand, if the municipality is acting in its "proprietary," p-
vate," or "corporate" capacity when the injury occurs, recovery may
be allowed. In determining whether a function is "proprietary" or
"governmental," the courts have considered, inter alia, the following
factors: whether the city receives any revenue from the enterprise; 3
whether the activity is for the benefit of the public at large, or for
the benefit of a specific locality;4 the authority under which the en-
terprise is established;5 and whether the activity is one which can be
performed adequately only by the government.6
An analogous device employed by the courts in determining the
liability of municipalities is the distinction between 'legislative,"
'Prosser, Torts § 770 (2d ed. 1955); Smith, Municipal Tort Immunity, 48
Mich. L. Rev. 41 (1949); Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 84 Yale
L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25).
2 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 539 (1798).
3 Note, 34 Ky. L.J. 217 (1946); see Borchard, supra note 1, at 136.
4 Borchard, supra note 1, at 136.
5 Note, 34 Ky. L.J. 217 (1946).0 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 775.
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"judicial," "quasi-legislative," and "quasi-judicial" activities on the one
hand, and "ministerial" activities on the other. Accordingly, as a gen-
eral rule, a municipality is not liable for nonfeasance or misfeasance
of a "judicial" or 'legislative" character, but is liable for negligent
performance of "ministerial" duties.7 "Legislative," "judicial," "quasi-
legislative," and "quasi-judicial" activities might be defined as those
requiring discretion, personal deliberation, decision, or judgment;
whereas "ministerial" actions are those amounting only to an obedi-
ence of orders or the performance of a duty in which the official is
left no choice of his own.8 An example of the distinction is that the
planning of streets would be "legislative" in nature, and would not
result in liability, whereas the actual construction of the streets would
be "ministerial," and, if negligently done, might lead to an actionable
injury.
It is highly important to keep this distinction in mind since
the court, in the Haney case, explicitly noted that the decision does
not impose liability on a municipality for torts committed while in
the exercise of "legislative," "judicial," "quasi-legislative," or "quasi-
judicial" functions. It is believed that the court showed wisdom in
leaving the 'legislative-judicial" immunity intact. The complex op-
eration of government administration demands that officials be charged
with the responsibility of making decisions. Liability for such discre-
tionary judgments would unduly hamper and intimidate officials.
Since 1957, at least eight states, besides Kentucky, have cast off
the archaic municipal immunity doctrine.9 The legal anachronism of
municipal immunity is diametrical to such legal maxims as "for every
injury the law gives a remedy" and "liability follows negligence." This
contrariety has resulted in many unjust decisions and has compelled
the individual victims of municipal torts to sustain a frequently
unbearable burden.
As pointed out above, the origin of the immunity is the common
law maxim that "the King can do no wrong"; a maxim which mani-
festly has no place in contemporary law. The Florida Court in Har-
grove v. Town of Cocoa Beach0 poignantly recalled the "wrongs"
738 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 578 (1941).
sProsser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 781; 38 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations
§ 578 (1941).
9 Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 390 P.2d 2 (Wash. 1964); Stone v. Arizona High-
way Comm., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,
17 Wis.2d 26, 15 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Spanel v. Mounds View School District,
718 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 359 P.2d
457 (Cal. 1961); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1
(1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 M11. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 Co.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).10 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
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that produced the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary
War. Furthermore, the immunity of the king from the jurisdiction of
the king's court was purely personal and was predicated upon the
king's sovereignty and supposed divine nature. Obviously, munici-
palities possess neither sovereignty nor a divine nature.1 "The social
climate which fostered the growth of absolutism and the divine right
of kings in England has long since been tempered with the warm
winds of humanitarianism and individual freedom."' 2
By overturning the municipal tort immunity doctrine, the court
cast off the onerous distinction betveen "governmental" and "pro-
prietary" functions. The distinction, which is specious and unservice-
able, has been criticized by innumerable courts and scholars,13 and the
Supreme Court has epitomized it as "inherently unsound." 14 Deci-
sions which have attempted to apply the distinction are hopelessly
irreconcilable and without logical delineation; for example, it has
been held that the act of constructing a sewer is "governmental" in
nature, and without liability, 15 but, thereafter, if the municipality
negligently causes the basement of a connecting residence to be
flooded, the act is "proprietary" and the city is liable. 6
The immunity doctrine has prevented any attempt to spread the
burden of loss over the community at large, and has thereby imposed
upon the injured individual a strenuous, if not insufferable, burden.
The municipality can, through insurance, provide for such exigencies
with little additional expense to the taxpayers. The courts have not
hesitated to impose liability upon industrial and business corpora-
tions, although, admittedly, such corporations pass their losses from
tort suits on to the consuming public through increased prices. Further-
more, in examining the doctrine of charitable immunity, a somewhat
related area, we find that the courts are rapidly overthrowing the
immunity of charities.17
Many scholars have convincingly argued that rejection of the
municipal tort immunity doctrine would lead to greater efficiency in
municipal endeavors and more careful selection of municipal em-
11 Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
437, 439 (1941).
12 Smith, supra note 1, at 48.
13 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 774; V.T.C. Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan,
313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1957); Note, 40 Ky. L.J. 131 (1951).
14 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
'5 Smith's Adm'x v. Commissioners of Sewerage, 146 Ky. 562, 143 S.W. 3(1912).
10 Board of Councilmen v. Buttimer, 146 Ky. 815, 143 S.W. 410 (1912).
1 7 Mulliken v. The Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961);
see Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 786.
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ployees and officials.' 8 Also, some have speculated that the overthrow
of the doctrine would result in a substantial saving of time and money
by eliminating the necessity of litigants debating whether the mu-
nicipal act in question is immune from liability,' 9 and that litigation
would actually be lessened by the absence of the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction which has been so difficult to apply.2 °
The tenacity of the courts in adhering to the doctrine of municipal
tort immunity is at least partially attributable to their allegiance to
the doctrine of stare decisis. Although stare decisis is entitled to de-
ference, when a rule of law is fallacious and unjust, it should be
discarded.
One of the most controversial aspects of the Haney case is that
the court chose to apply the decision retroactively in all actions not
barred by the statute of limitations. At least two other courts which
have overthrown the immunity have applied their decisions retro-
actively.2'1 This retroactive application is not likely to be too onerous,
as the statute of limitations in Kentucky for many tort actions is one
year, and five years is ostensibly the longest period allowed in tort.2 2
Edwin Abell
CoNTRIAcTs-UNITED STATES SAVINGS BoiqDs-TxAsuRy REGULATIONS
As A TEam.-During his lifetime, the now deceased father bought a
number of Series E, United States Savings Bonds issued pursuant to
31 U.S.C.A. section 757(c). These were issued in his name jointly
with either one or the other of two sons, with the exception of a bond
issued solely in the name of one son. Subsequent to the purchase of
the bonds, the father married for the second time. Upon the authority
of Henderson's Arnr v. Bewley,' the circuit court, in a declaratory
judgment, determined that all of the bonds passed as intestate prop-
erty, the disposition of which was to be governed by the laws of
descent and distribution. Held: Reversed. The Treasury Department
Regulations are a part of the government contract, and under those
regulations "if either co-owner dies without the bond having been
18 Fuller & Casner, supra note 11, at 460; Borchard, supra note 1, at 134.
19 Fuller & Casner, supra note 11, at 462.2o Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions
of Municipal Corporations, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1925).
21 Stone v. Arizona Highway Conmm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 881 P.2d 107 (1963);
Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 21, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).2 2 Ky. Rev. Stat. cl. 413.
1264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953).
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